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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS 
INTEGRATED CARE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. Paul G. Maughan presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 030901884) 
Plaintiff/Appellant Emergency Physicians Integrated Care ("EPIC") submits the 
following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether Salt Lake County has an obligation to pay for emergency medical 
services provided to inmates in its custody by professional providers. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20060255-SC 
2) Whether Salt Lake County should pay the reasonable value for emergency 
medical services provided to inmates in Salt Lake County custody by professional 
providers. 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
Both issues were raised in plaintiffs Amended Complaint (R. 62), and plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the memorandum in support of that motion (R. 
81 & 111). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, [appellate courts] give 
the trial court's legal conclusions no particular deference." Mast v. Overson. 971 P.2d 
928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). The issues presented are questions of 
law. As such, they are reviewed under the "correctness" standard. State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Certified Surety Group. Ltd. v. UT Inc.. 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 
(Utah 1998) ("In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, 'we do not defer to 
the trial court's conclusion of law but review them for correctness.'" (citation omitted)). 
The underlying facts are not in dispute and should be reviewed in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff/appellant. Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) 
(court to present facts and reasonable inferences from them in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr.. 962 
2 
P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (on summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. EPIC brought the action below seeking compensation at fair market value for 
the medical services they provide to Salt Lake County detainees and inmates. Complaint 
(R. 1); Amended Compliant (R. 62). 
2. EPIC submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 31, 2005 (R. 111). 
3. Defendant Salt Lake County ("the County") filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 135) and Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment on July 13, 2005 (R. 132). 
4. After completing the briefing on those motions, the parties presented oral 
argument on December 15, 2005 (R. 257). At that time, the district court judge requested 
additional briefing which was submitted by the parties on January 17, 2006 (R. 191, 200, 
206 & 213). 
5. On February 8, 2006, the court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
("Memorandum Decision"), denying EPIC's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 
the County's Motion for Summary Judgment "to the extent that the Plaintiff has not 
shown that it is entitled to recover under a claim ofquantum meruit'' Memorandum 
Decision, p. 1 (R. 229). The Court entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2, 
2006 (R. 236) 
6. This timely appeal followed (R. 245). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. EPIC is a Utah limited liability corporation which was formed for the business 
purpose of arranging for the billing and collection of payment for services provided by a 
number of different emergency physicians in the State of Utah. Many of the physicians 
who have an ownership interest in EPIC provided medical care to Salt Lake County jail 
inmates in need of emergency medical treatment. EPIC holds the right to pursue payment 
of claims arising out of treatment provided by emergency room physicians and that are 
the subject of this case. Amended Complaint, % 1 (R. 62); Affidavit of Robert Parker 
("ParkerAff.")?H3(R. 118). 
2. Salt Lake County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and as part of 
its activities operates correctional facilities within the County. Complaint, f 2 (R. 63); 
Answer, % 2 (R. 75). 
3. Beginning in February of 2000, and continuing thereafter, many County 
inmates have been treated by EPIC physicians at a number of different health care 
facilities within Salt Lake County. Amended Complaint, f 6 (R. 63); Answer, f 6 (R. 75). 
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4. When medical situations arise at the jail, nurses contracted by the County to 
provide services, and who work at the jail, screen the inmates. A nurse determines 
whether the medical care required is either beyond the capacity of the medical personnel 
at the jail to handle or whether emergency medical services from outside the jail are 
necessary. Deposition of Captain Troy Dial ("Dial Depo"), pp. 24:3-28:12 (R. 103-104). 
A copy of the Dial Depo is attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 98-110). 
5. Where medical services require emergency care or are beyond the capacity of 
County-contracted, on-site medical personnel, inmates are transported to a nearby 
hospital. Consequently, there is a regular need for emergency medical services from 
physicians outside the jail on the part of Salt Lake County jail inmates. Id. (R. 103-104). 
6. When individuals in need of emergency medical care present themselves to 
health care facilities, the facilities and the individual physicians working at the facilities, 
have an obligation under Federal law to provide emergency medical treatment, at least 
until the patient is stable, regardless of the individual's ability to pay. Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 dd. 
7. If the County did not provide or arrange for the provision of competent 
emergency medical services to inmates in need of those services, the County 
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acknowledges it may be liable to inmates for damages arising out of the failure to provide 
those services. Dial Depo, p. 14:23-15:3 (R. 101). 
8. The County also acknowledges that it has a Constitutional obligation to provide 
or arrange for the provision of competent medical care for the inmates at the jail. Dial 
Depo, pp. 11:22-12:9 (R. 100). 
9. EPIC has requested payment for its emergency medical services provided to 
Salt Lake County jail inmates from the County but, as to some inmates, the County has 
denied that it has any legal duty to pay for the medical services provided by EPIC. 
Answer, Second Defense, f 3 (R. 75). 
10. Alternatively, the County has maintained the right to pay EPIC for emergency 
medical services based on Medicaid Fee Schedules established by the State of Utah. 
Answer, Sixth and Seventh Defenses (R. 76-77). 
11. Expenses for medical services provided by physicians are billed separately 
from expenses for medical care provided by a hospital or other health care facility. The 
medical billings for health care facilities include charges for services such as room and 
board, hospital ancillary services and supplies. The separate billing for professional 
services is for the services provided by the physician only. Affidavit of James Antinori, 
M.D. ("Antinori Aff."), ffll 4-5 (R. 115). 
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12. Fee schedules have been developed by the Utah Medicaid program for both 
professional services and for health care facility charges. Relative to their respective 
billed charges, the rate of reimbursement for emergency medical services provided by 
health care facilities is significantly higher than the rate of reimbursement for emergency 
medical services provided by professionals. Parker Aff., Tf 4 (R. 118). 
13. Effective April 30, 2001, Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, which enumerates 
"county charges/' was amended. Under the amended statute, unless there is a contract 
between a health care facility and a County, the County is required to pay the health care 
facility's expenses for care provided to jail inmates only to the extent that the inmate is 
not covered by any private insurance and at a rate no higher than the Utah State Medicaid 
Fee Schedule. Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (l)(k) & (2)(a)&(b). The statute is silent as 
to how heath care professionals must be compensated. 
14. During debate on the amendment to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, the 
legislature considered making all health care providers subject to payment at the Utah 
State Medicaid rates. However, language referring to medical services provided by any 
"health care provider" was purposefully deleted to ensure that the scope of the legislation 
did not compel health care professionals (as opposed to health care facilities) to accept 
payment at Medicaid rates. Affidavit of Brian S. King ("King Aff.") (R. 127-128; 130), 
Exhibits A and B; Antinori Aff, fflf 6-7 (R. 115-116). 
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15. Health care professionals, such as emergency room doctors, opted out of the 
amendments to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 because the discrepancy between the fee 
schedules established by Medicaid for reimbursement of health care facilities for 
emergency services versus the reimbursement rate for emergency room physicians is 
significant. While health care facilities are reimbursed at a rate of approximately 98% of 
the health care facility's usual and customary charges for emergency room services under 
the Medicaid schedules, those schedules pay only a range of between 18 to 27% of usual 
and customary emergency room physician charges. Parker Aff., f 5-6 (R. 118); Antinori 
Aff, t 7 (R. 116). 
16. The billed charges from health care professionals for their services are 
developed by taking into account the training of those professionals, the market in which 
the professionals are working and the overhead associated with the professionals' 
services. The billed charges are the "usual and customary charges" of the physicians and 
are the same regardless of who receives or pays for the services. The billed charges 
represent the reasonable value of the physicians' services. Parker Aff., Tj 7. (R. 119). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is well established that governmental entities have a constitutional obligation to 
provide medical care to inmates and pretrial detainees. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that governments are Constitutionally required to provide necessary medical care to 
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individuals who are in governmental custody or have been detained. However, once the 
governmental entity ensures that medical care is provided, the issue of how the cost of 
that care should be allocated between the entity and the provider of the care is a matter of 
state law. The state law that should have been applied by the lower court is two-fold, 
found both in a statutory basis and state law equitable principles. 
The terms of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 require the County to pay for emergency 
medical services of county jail inmates. The lower court erred in determining that Utah 
Code Ann. §17-50-319 did not specifically allocate costs of emergency services to 
counties. The Utah statutory scheme contemplates that counties should be responsible for 
expenses related to its penological duties. Several provisions in that section obligate of 
the County to pay for emergency medical services to County jail inmates, including "the 
expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of a 
criminal offense and committed to the county jail." 
In addition, the County is responsible to pay for the medical services provided by 
EPIC under equitable principles. The right is found in EPIC's quantum meruit claim. 
Quantum meruit operates to prevent the County's enrichment at EPIC's expense. Salt 
Lake County knowingly received a benefit, and under circumstances of this case, it is 
unjust for the County to retain that benefit without paying EPIC. 
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Salt Lake County has received and continues to receive a substantial benefit as a 
result of the medical treatment provided to inmates by EPIC physicians. The County 
discharges a key constitutional duty by using EPIC doctors. The County benefits through 
money saved by not retaining a staff of physicians capable of dealing with all emergency 
care that may arise at the jail, along with associated savings of overhead costs. The 
County limits its exposure to legal claims that it might otherwise face. Alternatively, the 
measure of damages is the usual and customary charges of the physicians for their 
services. 
The County admits that it is Constitutionally required to provide medical services 
to County jail inmates as the need to provide medically necessary care for the inmates 
arises. Likewise, the County acknowledges that on a regular basis, it relies on and 
regularly utilizes care provided by EPIC physicians. The County recognizes that these 
physicians are highly trained professionals. 
The County is unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit bestowed by EPIC without 
remuneration. The County asserted that it is willing to pay the EPIC physicians, but only 
at the Medicaid rates. That level of compensation is significantly less than the billed 
charges for the physicians. The measure of recovery is the value of the benefit conferred 
on the County, and should be calculated at EPIC's usual and customary charges. 
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The lower court relied on Myrtle Beach Hospital. Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach. 532 
S.E.2d 868 (2000). The health care facility in that case sought reimbursement for medical 
care rendered to pre-trial detainees. South Carolina had several statutes related to the 
treatment of post-conviction inmates, but not pre-trial detainees. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court found that those statutes expressed legislative intent that jailers should 
bear expenses, including health care expenses, for inmates following their convictions, 
but they did not apply to pre-trial detainees. The relevant Utah statute, however, makes 
no distinction between pre-trial and post-conviction detainees. Utah obligates counties to 
provide for both. 
The analysis in Myrtle Beach Hospital as to quantum meruit was poor. Myrtle 
Beach Hospital held that it was the detainee and not the city who received the benefit of 
the medical care rendered by outside health care providers. That case found that the city 
only received an "incidental" benefit and dismissed the fact that obtaining competent 
medical care for jail inmates discharges Constitutional and common law duties that, were 
they breached, would give rise to costly liability claims against the City. The value of 
having EPIC available to discharge the County's Constitutional imperative is not 
"incidental." 
Finally, most courts have ruled that once a duty to provide inmates with necessary 
medical treatment is established, whether by statute or Constitutional obligation, absent 
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legislative directive to the contrary, cities or counties are obligated to pay for those 
services 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COUNTY HAS AN OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE EPIC FOR 
MEDICAL SERVICES PROVIDED TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE CUSTODY 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
The services provided by EPIC confer significant value on Salt Lake County. 
Without the availability of emergency medical services, the County would be exposed to 
enormous financial liability to its jail population for failing to provide necessary medical 
care. The benefit conferred on the County by EPIC obligates the County to pay for the 
reasonable value of EPICs services. 
A. Salt Lake County has a constitutional obligation to provide necessary 
medical care to individuals in custody. 
Inmates at the Salt Lake County jail regularly need medical care while 
incarcerated. This treatment is generally provided by physicians or other health care 
personnel hired by the County and working at the jail. However, jail inmates often need 
emergency medical care that is beyond the resources of the jail to provide on-site. This 
care is provided by physicians working outside the jail who do not have an express 
written contract with the County. EPIC, a group of such doctors, brought this action 
seeking compensation for the reasonable value of the services they provide to Salt Lake 
County. 
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EPIC asked the lower court to determine what responsibility Salt Lake County has 
to pay for emergency medical services provided by private, non-contracted physicians to 
County jail inmates. The lower court held "that plaintiffs claim in quantum meruit fails 
because . . . it is the inmate, and not the County, that is the primary beneficiary of the 
medical services provided by plaintiffs physicians." Memorandum Decision, p. 5. 
It is well established that governmental entities have a constitutional obligation to 
provide medical care to inmates and pretrial detainees. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that governments are Constitutionally required to provide necessary medical care to 
individuals who are in governmental custody or have been detained. City of Revere v. 
Massachusetts General Hospital 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983). This right derives from 
either the Eighth Amendment (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment) for individuals 
who have been formally adjudicated guilty in accordance with the legal process, or under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for individuals who have been 
detained or are in the custody of the police before there has been a formal adjudication of 
guilt. City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 243-44. As to payment for necessary medical care, the 
Court indicated that: " . . . as long as the governmental entity ensures that the medical care 
needed is in fact provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care 
should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care. That is a matter of 
state law." 463 U.S. at 245. However, the Supreme Court also stated, "if... the 
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governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed for a detainee only by paying for 
it, then it must pay " Revere, 463 U.S. at 244-246. The state law the lower court 
should have applied in evaluating the County's responsibility to pay EPIC is based on 
statutory and equitable principles. 
B. The terms of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 require the County to pay for 
emergency medical services of jail inmates. 
The lower court erred in determining that Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 did not 
specifically allocate costs of emergency services to counties. Memorandum Decision, p. 
4.1 The language of the statute makes clear the legislature's intent that the County pay for 
expenses necessarily incurred in operating its jail system. The title of the statute is 
"County Charges Enumerated." The Utah statutory scheme contemplates that counties 
should be responsible for expenses related to their penological duties. Indeed, several 
provisions in that section contain language that obligates the County to pay for emergency 
medical services to County jail inmates. 
The statute lists a number of charges and expenses for which the County is 
responsible. The categories of expenses listed in the statute that are relevant to, and broad 
1
 The parties below made arguments regarding Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (l)(k) 
& (2). However, the lower Court did not address those arguments. Memorandum 
Decision, p. 5. 
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enough to cover, emergency medical services provided by EPIC to County jail inmates 
are the following: 
(1) County charges are: 
(a) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(b) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney 
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution 
of criminal cases, except jury and witness fees; 
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged 
with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county 
jail; 
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit 
of the county; 
* * * 
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil 
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties 
imposed upon them by law . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (l)(a)-(c), (f)&(g). Any one of these provisions is sufficient 
to conclude that emergency medical expenses incurred by County jail inmates are "county 
charges" for which the County is responsible to pay. By definition, if the expenses are 
"necessary," then the County incurs more than an incidental benefit. 
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C. Under equitable provisions, the County is also responsible to pay for the 
medical services provided by EPIC and other professional providers up to 
the amount of benefit conferred on the County. 
EPIC's right to be compensated for medical services provided by its physicians 
also arises out of equitable principles. The lower court ruled that this case does not 
qualify under the theory of quantum meruit. The court primarily based its ruling on its 
conclusion that the primary beneficiary of the services is the inmate. Memorandum 
Decision, p. 5.2 
The lower court erred in ruling that quantum meruit principles do not apply to this 
case. State law equitable principles dealing with contracts implied in law, or implied in 
fact, apply to provide a remedy to the EPIC physicians. 
Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. Both branches, however, are 
rooted in "justice," . . . to prevent the defendant's enrichment at the 
plaintiffs expense . . . . Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-
contract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution . . . . 
The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied in law are: (1) the 
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust 
for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for i t . . . . The 
measure of recovery under quasi-contract, or contract implied in law, is the 
2
 A secondary basis for the lower court's conclusion was that EPIC has a federal 
statutory duty to provide medical care to jail inmates regardless of their ability to pay. 
EPIC is required under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
("EMTALA") 42 U.S.C. § 1395 dd, to provide medically necessary care to any person in 
need of emergency treatment. Nothing in that statute excuses the County from its 
obligation to pay for obligations incurred. 
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value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the defendant's gain) and 
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff . . . or necessarily the reasonable 
value of the plaintiffs services. 
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987) (citations omitted). The second 
branch of quantum meruit is as follows: 
A contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct. . . . The 
elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to 
compensate him or her for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or 
should have known that the plaintiff expected compensation... "Technically, 
recovery in contract implied in fact is the amount the parties intended as the 
contract price. If that amount is unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties 
intended the amount to be the reasonable market value for the plaintiffs 
services." 
Id, (citations omitted); see also Bailey-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 425-26 
(Utah App. 1994). While both branches of quantum meruit may apply in this matter, the 
first branch of quantum meruit described in Davies. quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, 
is most appropriate given the facts of this matter. 
1) Salt Lake County receives a benefit by using EPIC doctors to provide 
necessary health care to County inmates and detainees. 
There is no question that Salt Lake County has received and continues to receive a 
substantial benefit as a result of the medical treatment provided to County jail inmates by 
EPIC physicians. It discharges a key constitutional duty by using EPIC doctors. The 
benefit to the County also includes money the County saves by not retaining the full-time 
services of a staff of physicians capable of dealing with all emergency care that may arise 
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at the jail, along with associated savings of overhead costs associated with maintaining a 
health care facility at the jail that is capable of handling a wide variety of medical needs. 
The benefit the County realizes is also measured by the degree to which the 
County minimizes its exposure to pay significant consequential damages to inmates 
harmed by the County's failure to provide reasonably necessary emergency medical care 
to jail inmates. By relying on the expertise of EPIC physicians, the County minimizes the 
damages it might be required to pay inmates who would otherwise bring suit for damages 
resulting from the failure to provide any emergency medical care (civil right actions), or 
incompetent emergency medical care (malpractice actions), at the jail. 
There is also a public benefit received by the County. Utilizing EPIC physicians to 
meet the needs of the County in providing emergency medical services to jail inmates is a 
significantly more efficient method by which the County may fulfill its Constitutional 
obligation than by duplicating EPIC's professionals and ancillary resources at the jail. 
Establishing a new health care delivery system at the jail with the range of medical 
services, including providing doctors, equipment and facilities that exist in the private 
sector for treatment of emergency conditions is clearly not an efficient use of tax-payer 
funds. 
Alternatively, a measure of damages which is more susceptible to quantification 
and much more likely than not to be a smaller amount than the value of the benefit 
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conferred on Salt Lake County, is the usual and customary charges of the physicians for 
their services. The undisputed facts below establish that the range of charges for EPIC's 
physician services are based on their expertise, the cost of providing their services and the 
market rates for similar services from other physicians in the same geographic area. 
Parker Aff.,17 (R. 119). 
2) The County appreciates and acknowledges the benefits it receives from 
EPIC. 
The County admits that it is Constitutionally required to provide medical services 
to County jail inmates as the need to provide medically necessary care for the inmates 
arises. Dial Depo, pp. 11:22-12:9 (R. 100). Likewise, the County acknowledges that on a 
regular basis, it relies on and regularly utilizes care provided by EPIC physicians. 
Answer, f 6 (R. 75); Dial Depo, pp. 24:3-28:12 (R. 103-104). The County recognizes 
that these physicians are highly trained professionals. Id. There is also no question that 
the County has the resources to pay the physicians and that EPIC physician services 
confer a substantial benefit on the County and its taxpayers. 
3) The County is unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit bestowed by 
EPIC without remuneration. 
The final prong is whether it is unjust for the County to retain the benefit provided 
by EPIC without paying the EPIC physicians the billed charges for their services. The 
County argued below that it is willing to pay the EPIC physicians, but only at the 
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Medicaid rates. It is undisputed that this level of compensation is significantly less than 
the billed charges for the physicians. Parker Aff., f^ 5 (R. 118). 
The measure of recovery outlined in Davies for this type of equitable relief is "the 
value of the benefit conferred on the defendant [the County] rather than the detriment 
incurred by the plaintiff [EPIC]." Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. This usual and customary 
charge is the same for each EPIC physician, regardless of the identity of the payor. 
Individual physicians or physicians' groups may choose to enter into contracts with a 
variety of different payors. However, where there is no contract in place, it is an accepted 
principle that a payor is legally responsible to pay the reasonable value of the physician's 
services. That reasonable value should be the usual and customary charges established by 
the physician for his or her services based on the factors outlined by Robert Parker, 
EPIC's CEO, in his Affidavit, ffl[ 6-7 (R. 118-119) . This Court should overturn the lower 
court ruling, and require the County to pay the billed charges of the EPIC physicians. 
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW HOLDS AGAINST THE LOWER COURT 
DECISION. 
In rendering its opinion, the lower court relied on Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. 
City of Myrtle Beach. 532 S.E.2d 868 (2000). Myrtle Beach Hospital represents the 
minority position among the courts that have considered this issue. Most courts that have 
considered this issue, have ruled that once a duty to provide inmates with necessary 
medical treatment is established, whether by statute or Constitutional obligation, absent 
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legislative directive to the contrary, cities or counties are obligated to pay for those 
services. See, e.g., Lutheran Medical Center v. City of Omaha. 429 N.W.2d 347, 351-52 
(Neb. 1988) (even in the absence of statutory duty to pay, there is a "common-law implied 
contractual duty to pay such expenses" to the provider of necessary medical expenses); 
Union County v. Warner Brown Hospital. 762 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Ark. 1989) (County has 
obligation not only to supply necessary medical treatment but to pay for it when 
necessary); Spicer v. Williamson. 132 S.E. 291, 294-95 (N.C. 1926) (County is required 
to provide and, when necessary, pay for necessary medical services to inmates); Hospital 
Bd. of Directors of Lee County v. Durkis. 426 So.2d 50, 51 (Fla. App. 1982) (Hospital 
can recover its necessary and reasonable charges of providing care to inmate in light of 
Sheriffs legal duty to provide access to medical treatment); Poudre Valley Health Care. 
Inc. v. City of Loveland. 85 P.3d 558, 559-61 (Colo. App. 2003) (where statute imposes 
duty to provide medical care for inmates and is silent as to who bears cost, municipality 
must pay the amount of the claimed costs); The United Hospital v. D'Annunzio. 514 
N.W.2d 681, 684-686 (N.D. 1994) (statute creating duty to provide medical treatment to 
inmates carries with it implied obligation to pay for that treatment); Harrison Memorial 
Hospital v. Kitsap County. 700 P.2d 732 (Wash. 1985) (Washington state statutes impose 
liability for medical expenses incurred by jail inmates); and, Smith v. Linn County. 342 
N.W.2d 861, 863 (Iowa 1984) (statutory obligation to "furnish . . . medical aid" to county 
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jail inmates together with state statute which makes as a county expense "all charges and 
expenses for the safekeeping and maintenance of prisoners" carries with it an obligation 
to pay the provider of care).3 
A closer look at two of these cases reinforce the County's obligation to pay EPIC's 
billed charges. In Poudre Valley Health Care the issue was "whether a governmental 
entity has an obligation to pay for outside medical costs incurred in the care and treatment 
of a pretrial detainee in its custody." Id at 559. Pursuant to the Revere case, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals recognized that it "must apply Colorado law in determining 
whether the City is liable for the costs incurred by the Hospital in affording medical care 
and treatment to the pretrial detainee." Id There was no Colorado statute that expressly 
addressed the issue. Id. at 560. However, the court found that the general statute 
regarding persons in custody contained an implied obligation to pay the costs of medical 
care. The Colorado statute reads: 
Persons arrested or in custody shall be treated humanely and shall be provided 
with adequate food, shelter, and, if required, medical treatment. 
Colorado Rev. Statutes § 16-3-401 (2) (2002). Thus, the court found, 
3
 The Smith case was procedurally odd. It was brought by the prisoner asserting 
that the County should reimburse him for injuries incurred after his arrest. The court 
refused reimbursement to Smith, but affirmed that "jailers [must] make . . . life-sustaining 
necessities as medical services available to all prisoner and to assure payment by the 
appropriate governmental unit to person who provide those services." Smith, 342 
N.W.2d at 863 (emphasis added). 
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where . . . a state statute unambiguously imposes a duty on governmental 
entities to provide medical treatment and care for detainees in their custody, 
such a duty includes or, at a minimum, implies an inherent obligation to pay 
the costs of such treatment and care. 
Poudre Valley Health Care, 85 P.3d at 561. Utah imposes a similar duty on counties for 
"the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of 
a criminal offense and committed to the county jail." Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (1) 
After the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Revere, Nebraska reexamined the issue 
of payment to medical providers for care provided to inmates in Lutheran Medical Center, 
supra ("Lutheran II"). In a dispute between the same parties, Nebraska had previously 
found that governmental entities indeed had a duty to pay health care providers for 
medical care rendered to those in custody in Lutheran Medical Center v. City of Omaha, 
281 N.W.2d 786 (1979) ("Lutheran I"). In both cases, the Nebraska Court discussed the 
relationships between police, detainee, and health care provider: 
The concept that an imprisoning authority has a legal obligation to supply 
medical services to prisoners is not of recent origin, nor was it originally based 
on statutes. At common law, it was stated: "The rule where a person requests 
the performance of a service, and the request is complied with, and the service 
performed, there is an implied promise to pay for the services, does not apply 
where a person requests a physician to perform services for a patient, unless 
the relation of that person to the patient is such as raises a legal obligation on 
his part to call in a physician and pay for the services, or the circumstances are 
such as to show an intention on his part to pay for the services . . . . 
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Lutheran IL 429 N.W.2d at 348 {quoting Lutheran I. 281 N.W.2d at 788 (emphasis in 
original)(additional citations omitted)). In situations where an individual requiring 
medical care is in custody, and based upon the relation between the patient and the 
detaining entity, Lutheran I found not only a constitutional duty to provide such medical 
care, but a common-law liability to pay for such medical care. 
After Revere, the Nebraska Supreme Court reaffirmed unequivocally Nebraska's 
"common-law liability [for government entities] to pay for medical treatment required by 
a person in policy custody . . . ." Lutheran IL 429 N.W.2d at 352. Thus, even absent a 
statute on point, Nebraska found a duty for governmental agencies to pay for medical 
treatment of inmates and detainees. In this case, EPIC's position is strengthened, again, 
by the fact that the statutory scheme clearly contemplates that counties should be 
responsible for "the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with 
or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail." Utah Code Ann. 
§17-50-319 (l)(b). 
In addition to being the minority position, the analysis in Myrtle Beach Hospital as 
to quantum meruit was poor. Myrtle Beach Hospital held that it was the inmate and not 
the city who received the benefit of the medical care rendered by outside health care 
providers, an argument adopted by the court below. Relegated to a footnote is the 
acknowledgment that the City of Myrtle Beach obtains benefit by satisfying its 
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Constitutional duty to ensure that inmates receive medical care. Myrtle Beach Hospital 
532 S.E.2d at 873 n.12. However, the footnote refers to this benefit as "incidental" and 
brushes aside the fact that obtaining competent medical care for jail inmates discharges 
Constitutional and common law duties that, were they breached, would give rise to costly 
liability claims against the City. The same is true for the County. The value of having 
EPIC available as a means to discharge the County's Constitutional imperative in this 
case is not "incidental." 
Myrtle Beach Hospital saw a distinction between pre-trial detainees and post-
conviction inmates. The health care facility in that case sought reimbursement for 
medical care rendered to pre-trial detainees. Id. at 869. To support its claim, the health 
care facility cited statutes that dealt only with post-conviction inmates. Id at 871. Those 
statutes related to 
the State's policy to render 'humane treatment' to persons serving a term in the 
State Penitentiary . . .; [a statute] instructing that the DOC director is 
responsible 'for the proper care, treatment, feeding, closing, and management 
of the prisoners confined therein'...; a statute requiring certain entities using 
state convicts to reimburse the DOC for 'moneys expended . . . for medical 
attention . . . ' . . . ; and, to provisions made for the comfort and treatment of 
prisoners in county jail. . . and of convicts working on chain gangs. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The South Carolina Supreme Court found that 
these statutes express the legislative intent that jailers (whether county of state) 
are to bear the expenses, including those incurred in rendering health care, for 
persons incarcerated following their convictions. 
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Id. (emphasis added). The South Carolina Supreme Court stated: "the Hospital 
acknowledges, as it must, that no state statute requires the City to bear the medical 
expenses of the pre-trial detainees." Myrtle Beach Hospital, 532 S.E.2d at 870 (emphasis 
added). Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 makes no distinction between pretrial detainees and 
post-conviction inmates. Utah obligates the County to provide for both, a component 
missing for the hospital that provided medical services to pre-trial detainees in Myrtle 
Beach Hospital. Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 establishes a duty of the County not only to 
provide medical treatment to inmates but also to pay for that treatment. 
The County argued below that the express, unambiguous terms of that statute 
demonstrate a knowing choice by the legislature to require the County to pay for only 
medical services provided by health care facilities and to deny any right whatsoever for 
professional health care providers to recover any payment for their services. Nothing in 
Myrtle Beach Hospital supports such a reading of the statute. In effect, the County 
attributes to the legislature an intent to require the County to pay for the facility charges 
arising out of the treatment of an inmate while requiring that the professional health care 
providers who render services to the same inmate at the same time do so for free. This is 
not a rational interpretation of the statute. It is especially unjustified in light of the 
legislative history of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319. 
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III. THE BENEFIT CONFERRED ON THE COUNTY AS A RESULT OF 
EPIC'S SERVICES IS SIGNIFICANT AND TRIGGERS A DUTY TO PAY 
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THOSE SERVICES. 
Should this Court overturn the ruling below, the sole remaining issue would be 
whether the County can force the EPIC doctors to accept Medicaid rates or whether the 
EPIC doctors can obtain from the County the reasonable value of their services. Any 
doubt regarding this issue resolved by the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-
319 (l)(k). During legislative debate on the amendment to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, 
proposed language referring to medical services provided by a "health care provider" was 
purposefully deleted to ensure that the scope of the legislation did not require that health 
care professionals (as opposed to health care facilities) be compelled to accept payment at 
Medicaid rates. King Aff, Exhibits A and B (R. 127-128; 130); Antinori Aff, ffl[ 6 - 7 
(R. 115-116). 
Health care professionals, such as emergency room doctors, opted out of the 
amendments to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 because the disparity between the fee 
schedules established by Medicaid for reimbursement of health care facilities for 
emergency services versus the reimbursement rate for emergency room physicians 
relative to those providers5 billed charges is significant. While health care facilities are 
reimbursed at a rate of approximately 98% of the health care facility's usual and 
customary charges for emergency room services under the Medicaid schedules, those 
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schedules pay only a range of between 18 to 27% of usual and customary emergency 
room physician charges. Parker Aff., ^ 5-6 (R. 118); Antinori Aff, f 7 (R. 116). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The County has a Constitutional obligation to provide necessary medical care to its 
inmates. The County recognizes that to the extent it fails to carry out this Constitutional 
duty, it may be liable to a claim for damages arising out of harm caused to inmates. 
Consequently, the County regularly utilizes the services of private health care facility and 
professional medical providers to discharge its Constitutional obligation. 
The result the lower court reached could not have been the intent of the Supreme 
Court in Revere. Nothing in Revere suggests that the County may emergency physicians 
as the lower court's ruling has done in this case. The services provided to jail inmates by 
EPIC physicians confer a significant benefit on the County. Under the circumstances of 
this case, it would be unjust for the County to retain that benefit without paying for it. 
Because the actual benefit realized by the County is difficult to measure, the County 
should at least be required to pay the reasonable market value of the services provided by 
EPIC. That is the billed charges of the physicians for their services. 
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This Court should overturn the lower court ruling, and require the County to pay 
the billed charges of the EPIC physicians. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of JUNE 2006. 
Attorneys for PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
BRIAN S. KING 
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
These issues implicate important rights and will affect the dealings of health care 
providers and governmental agencies. Theses issues reach beyond the immediate parties. 
Appellant believes that oral argument will give the parties a beneficial opportunity to 
explain their respective positions and to answer questions from the Court. 
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-319 
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TITLE 17. COUNTIES 
CHAPTER 50. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 3. COUNTY POWERS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-319 (2006) 
§ 17-50-319. County charges enumerated 
(1) County charges are: 
(a) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(b) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney incurred in criminal cases arising in the 
county, and all other expenses necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution of criminal 
cases, except jury and witness fees; 
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of a criminal offense and 
committed to the county jail; 
(d) for a county not within the state district court administrative system, the sum required by law to be paid jurors 
in civil cases; 
(e) all charges and accounts for services rendered by any justice court judge for services in the trial and 
examination of persons charged with a criminal offense not otherwise provided for by law; 
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit of the county; 
(g) every other sum directed by law to be raised for any county purposes under the direction of the county 
legislative body or declared a county charge; 
(h) the fees of constables for services rendered in criminal cases; 
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil and criminal cases arising in the county, and 
all other expenses necessarily incurred by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties imposed upon them by law; 
(j) the sums required by law to be paid by the county to jurors and witnesses serving at inquests and in criminal 
cases injustice courts; and 
(k) for a county of the first or second class and subject to Subsection (2), expenses incurred by a health care 
facility in providing medical services at the request of a county sheriff for existing conditions of: 
(i) persons booked into a county jail on a charge of a criminal offense; or 
(ii) persons convicted of a criminal offense and committed to a county jail. 
(2) (a) Expenses described in Subsection (l)(k) are a county charge only to the extent that they exceed any private 
insurance in effect that covers those expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-319 
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(b) If there is no contract between a county jail and a health care facility that establishes a fee schedule for 
medical services rendered, expenses under Subsection (l)(k) shall be commensurate with the current noncapitated state 
Medicaid rates. 
(c) Subsection (l)(k) does not apply to expenses of a person held at the jail at the request of an agency of the 
United States. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 538; C.L. 1917, § 1434; R.S. 1933, 19-11-17; L. 1941, ch. 20, § 1; C. 1943, 19-
11-17; L. 1977, ch. 212, § 6;1987,ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch. 152, § 2; 1990, ch. 59, § 5; 1993, ch. 38, § 8; C. 1953, 17-
15-17; renumbered by L. 2000, ch. 133, § 75; 2001, ch. 249, § 1. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsections (l)(k) and (2) and 
redesignated subsections. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -County audit, notice of, § 17-36-40. 
Courtrooms, cost of furnishings, § 78-7-13. 
Prisoners, care of generally, § 17-22-8. 
Sanity hearings, costs of, § 77-15-9. 
Settlement and allowances of accounts by county legislative body, § 17-53-305. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Expenses of county attorney. 
Cited. 
EXPENSES OF COUNTY ATTORNEY. 
While the district attorney, under Subsection (2) of this section, may incur necessary expenses in prosecution of 
criminal cases and may make them county charges, he may not bind the county beyond what is reasonably necessary, or 
for services rendered beyond the reasonable value thereof. Kytka v. Weber County, 48 Utah 421, 160 P. Ill (1916). 
CITED in Allison v. Utah County Corp., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (D. Utah 2004). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. -20 C.J.S. Counties § 172 et seq. 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
Memorandum Decision, entered on February 8, 2006 (R. 229-234). 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS 
INTEGRATED CARE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the state of Utah, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and 
ORDER 
Case No. 030901884 
Judge Paul G. Maughan 
Before the Court are the parties' respective Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Argument was heard by Hie court on December 15, 2005. At the conclusion of the hearing the 
court requested additional briefing from the parties regarding the County's obUgation to provide 
emergency medical care to its jail inmates under the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Revere 
v. Massachusetts General Hospital 463 U.S. 239 (1983). The parties supplemental briefing was 
submitted on January 17, 2006. 
For the reasons set forth below the court denies the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and grants the County's Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent that 
the Plaintiff has not shown that it is entitled to recover under a claim of quantum meruit. 
L Summary of Issues. 
The Plaintiff, EPIC, has brought suit in quantum meruit against the County to recover 
emergency physician expenses incurred in the treatment of County jail inmates who have been 
transferred for treatment from the County's jail to various hospitals staffed by EPIC physicians. 
In doing so, the Plaintiff asks the Court to find that because the County is constitutionally 
obligated under City of Revere to provide medical care to inmates the County is benefitted by the 
inmates' treatment; that the County knew it had received a benefit; and that the County has not 
adequately compensated the Plaintiff for that benefit. 
The County argues that it has been paying for the emergency room physician's services 
pursuant to the state's uncapitated Medicaid rate. The County argues that it is paying that rate 
absent an agreement between the parties pursuant to Utah Code Section 17-50-319 (l)(k) and (2). 
Therefore the issue before the court is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to additional compensation 
under its theory of quantum meruit. 
The County has also opposed this action claiming that it is immune from suit under the 
state's Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1 et. seq. Utah Code. The Plaintiff correctly 
argues that the Act does not apply to claims in equity. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 
(Utah 2004). 
IL Background, 
Members of the County's jail population regularly require medical attention. Much of 
this care is provided on site by medical staff employed by, or under contract with, the County. 
There are occasions when an inmate's medical condition requires more care than can be provided 
at the jail's on site infirmary. On such occasions these inmates are transferred to a medical 
facility where they are sometimes treated by EPIC physicians. 
EPIC is a Utah limited liability corporation which was formed to provide billing and 
collection services for a number of emergency physicians in the state of Utah. Many of the 
physicians who have an ownership interest in EPIC have provided emergency medical services to 
County jail inmates. These physicians now seek to recover payment under quantum meruit for 
those services above and beyond the statutory medicaid reimbursement rate that is currently used 
by the County. 
III. Summary Judgment Standard. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court determines that "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56. On a motion for summary judgment, the court 
*"view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.'" Young Elec. Sign Co,, Inc. V. State ex rel Utah Dept Of Transportation, 
110P.3d 1118, 1119 (citations omitted). 
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IV. Discussion and findings. 
In order to recover in quantim meruit, EPIC must first establish that it has, or is, 
conferring a benefit upon the County. EPIC argues that by treating county jail inmates that it is 
conferring a significant, as opposed to an incidental, benefit upon the County, and without such 
treatment, the County could face significant financial exposure. EPIC also argues that the 
County's constitutional duty under the Eighth amendment to provide for medical treatment 
received by its inmates also extends to the duty to pay for those services. At first blush, this 
argument seems both logical and persuasive. However, upon scrutiny, the Court finds that it is 
neither. 
In City of Revere the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause 
requires a governmental entity to provide medical care to individuals who have been injured 
while being apprehended by the police. The Court then noted that the 8th Amendment provides 
the same protection to inmates. The Court held that the governmental entity fulfills it 8th 
Amendment obligations to incarcerated individuals by seeing that individuals are promptly taken 
to a hospital and provided necessary medical care. 463 U.S. 239, 244-245 (1983). In so holding 
the Court stated that as long as the governmental entity ensured that required medical care was in 
fact provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care should be allocated 
between the governmental entity and the medical provider. That issue, the court said, was a 
matter of state law. City of Revere, makes clear that the county's proscription of cruel and 
unusual punishment is violated only by a deliberate indifference to an inmate's need for medical 
care. Likewise, that duty is not violated so long as a sick or injured inmate is timely transported 
to a medical facility that can provide the necessary and required medical attention. 
In Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 868 (2000), the South 
Carolina Supreme Court applied Revere in denying a claim in quantum meruit where a hospital 
had claimed that it had conferred a benefit upon the defendant city by rendering medical care to 
detainees of the city. The court held that it was the detainee and not the city that received and 
retained the benefit of medical care. Id. At 872. It further held that the only duty upon the city, 
under the due process clause of the Constitution, was to see that the detainees were taken to a 
hospital to receive necessary treatment. The city was not required, under Revere, to pay for that 
treatment. This was despite the Court's acknowledgment in a footnote a that the city had 
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received an incidental benefit by seeing that the inmates had received the required medical care. 
Id at 873. 
In the present case, the Court finds Myrtle Beach Hospital persuasive. The court holds 
that the inmate, and not the County, is the primary beneficiary of the medical care rendered. The 
County should not be placed in the position of an insurer for medical care solely on the basis that 
an individual requires medical attention while an inmate. That s p e person, absent custody 
status, could present at a medical facility staffed by EPIC physicians and receive the same care. 
That person would still be the primary beneficiary and would have the primary obligation to pay 
for those services. The County does not assume the liability or obligation for medical care for 
individuals who knowingly or intentionally violate the law and subsequently become inmates 
under the state's penal system. 
The Court finds that EPIC understates its own statutory duty to provide emergency 
medical care to any individual, regardless of custody status under federal law. (See, Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1395(d).) EPIC has an 
obligation to provide medically necessary treatment regardless of the patient's ability to pay for 
tliose services under this Act. The burden of paying the cost of treatment falls first to the inmate, 
and then to the physician. 
Both parties have discussed the various provisions of Utah Code Section 17-50-319 as 
support for their argument that the state has or has not provided a statutory basis for the full 
payment of EPIC s fees. The Plaintiff especially relies upon subsections (a), (b), (c), (f) and (i). 
These sections, however, are all general provisions that deal with expenses incurred by the 
County or by the County's sheriff, but do not specifically address the payment of the fees for 
medical services. There is nothing in Utah Code Section 17-50-319 that indicates that the state 
has specifically allocated the costs of emergency physician services to counties. 
Plaintiff also cites numerous state cases which have held local governments accountable 
for payment for emergency medical services rendered. The Court finds these cases are actually 
in line with its decision today. As stated in City of Revere, a state can allocate the cost of inmate 
care to a city, county or other governmental entity. .These cases generally involve states, unlike 
Utah, that have allocated those costs to local governments by statute, common law or by 
assumption of the duty through a course of dealing. 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that plaintiffs claim in quantum 
meruit fails because the Court finds that it is the inmate, and not the County, that is the primary 
beneficiary of the medical services provided by plaintiffs physicians. Secondly, it is the inmate 
that has the primary duty and obligation to pay for those services. And finally, the plaintiffs 
physicians have an affirmative duty, under federal law, to provide medical care, regardless of the 
patient's ability to pay for those services. 
The duty to pay for this treatment is a matter that should be better addressed by state law, 
and that the provisions referenced above regarding Section 70-50-319(a), (b), (c), (f) and (i) do 
not require the County to pay for those services under those provisions.1 The Court finds that the 
County has met its Eighth Amendment and due process requirements under the Constitution by 
seeing that the inmates are not denied emergency medical treatment that they are required to 
receive. The Court, therefore, denies the plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and 
grants the County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to the extent that the County is not 
required to pay Epic Medical fees under Epic's claim of quantum meruit. 
The Defendant is to prepare the appropriate order. 
!Both parties argue the applicability of Section 17-50-319(l)(k) and (2); because the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden under quantum meruit, the Court does 
not address this argument. 
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Certificate of Notification 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of this Memorandum Decision and Order to the 
following on this ff day of February 2006: 
Brian S. King Attorney for Plaintiff 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Donald H. Hansen 
Melanie F. Mitchell 
Deputy District Attorneys 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
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